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THE COST OF THE TEXT
Richard Primust

Christopher Serkin and Nelson Tebbe's Is the Constitution
Special?4 explores many facets of constitutional interpretation.
I will focus here on their observation that constitutional inter
pretation is "less textual" than statutory interpretation. I place
the expression "less textual" in quotation marks because "tex
tual" could mean many things, such that it would often be
problematic to characterize one interpretive exercise as more or
less textual than another. In Serkin and Tebbe's view, as I
understand it, mainstream constitutional interpretation is
"less textual " than statutory decisionmaking in that it is less
constrained by the words of particular enacted clauses.5 As a
convenient shorthand, I will refer to the phenomenon that
Serkin and Tebbe observe-that lawyers and judges are more
prone to hew closely to the language of particular clauses in
statutory cases than in constitutional ones-as the "textualism
gap."
I suspect that Serkin and Tebbe are right to think that the
textualism gap exists. And a rich literature offers reasons why
legal practitioners should treat statutory and constitutional
t Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor, The University of Michigan
Law School. Thanks to Nicholas Bagley, Will Baude, and Mitchell Berman for
suggestions about this paper and to Christopher Serkin, Nelson Tebbe, and Kevin
Stack for their roles in this conversation.
4 Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 COR
NELL L. REV. 701 (2016).
5 To adapt a term from John Hart Ely, we might say that the kind of textual
ism that is at issue here is the "clause-bound" kind. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11-42 (1980) (describing and
criticizing "clause-bound interpretivism" in constitutional law).
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text differently. 6 For present purposes, however, I am less interested in whether interpreters should treat statutory language differently from constitutional language than I am in
explaining observed patterns in how practitioners actually do
treat the two kinds of text. If practitioners do treat the two
kinds of text differently in the ways that prescriptive theories
advocate, it is possible that the persuasive power of the theories explains, or helps to explain, the observed differences. But
it is also possible that the observed differences in practice are
largely independent of what judges and professors say ought to
be done. Indeed, the textualism gap might not reflect-or
might not merely reflect-any conscious choices among practitioners to treat the different kinds of text differently. Perhaps
the reasons for decisionmaking that does not hew closely to the
words of enacted clauses are roughly the same in the statutory
and constitutional contexts, but, for a combination of reasons,
the circumstances in which those reasons apply are more common in constitutional cases than in statutory ones.
Consider three reasons why judges decide cases on bases
other than the wording of particular enacted texts. 7 (1) Sometimes there is no enacted text directing a determinate answer to
the question that must be decided. (2) Sometimes prior courts
have decided cases that bear on the question at issue, such
that courts decide by reference to precedent rather than by
reference to an enacted text. (3) Sometimes the decision to
which enacted language points is simply unacceptable, such
that judges feel it would be irresponsible to follow the words of
a text meekly down the road to perdition.
Serkin and Tebbe have the first reason firmly in view. 8 The
Constitution contains many broadly worded standards, and
cases calling for the application of those standards require
something beyond textual reasoning. I suspect, however, that
the textualism gap is mostly a product of the other two reasons-the role of precedent and the costs of adhering to the
wording of enacted texts.

6

See, e.g., Kevin Stack. The Inferencefrom Authority to Interpretive Method in

Constitutionaland Statutory Domains, supra(responding to Serkin & Tebbe, supra
note 4).

7 By setting out these three reasons, I do not mean to suggest that decisionmaking by direct reference to enacted text is the normal or the default mode of
judicial decisionmaking in the American system.
8 See, e.g., Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 4, at 751 (identifying several broadly
worded constitutional clauses that might give rise to nontextual interpretation in
constitutional law).
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Consider the role of precedent first. Most constitutional
litigation occurs in a small number of doctrinal categories,
each of which is piled high with case law. As a result, judges
rarely have occasion to recur to the underlying text. Statutory
litigation also has many domains with richly developed case
law, and in those domains, it is similarly true that decisionmaking proceeds on the basis of case law more than by reference to enacted text. But because the U.S. Code is sprawling
and prolix, and because its text changes much more frequently
than the text of the Constitution does, statutory litigation features orders of magnitude more opportunities for decisionmaking in areas of first impression. As a result, more statutory
cases are decided by reference to the text directly.
Next, and perhaps most interestingly, consider the costs of
adhering strictly to the wording of enacted texts. Constitutional law, I suggest, is more prone than statutory law to furnish occasions on which following a text woodenly would yield
an unacceptable result in a high-stakes case. It does so not
because the Constitution is especially poorly drafted but because Americans in each generation have a way of making their
most salient issues into issues of constitutional law, whether or
not prior generations would have recognized them as such.
That means that constitutional law regularly presents highly
salient issues that the text of the Constitution was not written
to address. There is a persistent mismatch between the text of
the document and the set of concerns that well-socialized
American lawyers expect the Constitution to vindicate. Constitutional interpretation responds to that mismatch by deciding
cases nontextually-by which I mean, in this paper, deciding
cases in ways other than by reading enacted language to mean
something that might occur to a competent reader of English
who did not share the substantive expectations of American
constitutional lawyers. 9
I
OF NONTEXTUAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Courts sometimes depart from the words of enacted
clauses in statutory cases, not just in constitutional ones.
Serkin and Tebbe give the example of the Sherman Act, under
which courts have elaborated doctrine that particularizes a
general standard but without being guided by specific statutory
9 See Richard Primus, ConstitutionalExpectations, 109 MICH. L. REv. 91
(2010) (describing the role of the expectations of constitutional lawyers in shaping
the accepted readings of the Constitution's text).
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language. 10 In other words, decisionmaking under the Sherman Act does not proceed on the basis of close readings of
enacted text, and the reason why might be (most commentators just say that it is) the first of the reasons for "nontextual"
decisionmaking given above: the text is not specific enough to
resolve the issues presented.
In a different vein, consider the status of workplace affirmative action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
wording of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) does not contain vague language about equality that courts have particularized in a way
that permits affirmative action. On its face, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) seems to prohibit affirmative action, because it clearly and
flatly prohibits employers from distinguishing among employees or applicants on the basis of race or sex.II Nonetheless,
courts construe Title VII to permit affirmative action on the
basis of race and sex when certain conditions are met.1 2 Note
that courts do not pretend that the specific words of Title VII
permit affirmative action under those conditions as an exception to its otherwise general rules prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race and sex. Nor do courts claim that the wording
of Title VII is indeterminate on the point. They simply proceed
under established doctrine that treats affirmative action as
permissible under Title VII when the given conditions are met,
irrespective of what the words of the statute say.' 3
In other cases, courts wrestle with the meaning of words in
statutes, and even read the words closely, but then decide that
the words mean something that might surprise competent
readers of English. Consider King v. Burwell.14 The Supreme
Court in that case asked whether the phrase "an Exchange
established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act"1 5 refers only to exchanges es10

Serkin& Tebbe, supra note 4, at 752.

11 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) ("Employer practices. It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").

12 See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (sex); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (race).
13 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (initiating this
approach).
14

135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).

15

Id. at 2487 (emphasis omitted); 26 U.S.C.

§ 36B(b)-(c) (2012).
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tablished by state governments or also to certain exchanges
established by the federal government. The Court in King devoted considerable effort to a close reading of the statute, taking fourteen paragraphs to find the relevant language
"ambiguous" as between the two possibilities 1 6 and then explaining at similar length why the ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of reading "an Exchange established by the State" to
include exchanges established by the federal government. 1 7
In my view, King was rightly decided, and obviously so.
But the Court's characterization of the phrase "an Exchange
established by the State" as "ambiguous" requires critical scrutiny. Ordinarily, to say that a phrase is ambiguous is to say
that it admits of two different meanings. As applied here, the
suggestion would be that the words "the State" in section 1311
could mean either "the state" or "the state or the federal government." But the expression "the State" does not normally admit
of that second meaning.1 8 Moreover, the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) defines the term "State" to mean "[(a)] each of the 50
states [of the United States,] and [(b)] the District of Columbia." 19 Whatever problems the wording of section 1311 might
have raised, a lack of semantic clarity rooted in multiple possible meanings of the term "State" was not among them.
The decision in King makes sense not because a competent
reader of English who came across section 1311 standing alone
might wonder whether "the State" meant "the state" or "the
state or the federal government" but because the overall statute
of which section 1311 is a part-the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act-would make no sense if the phrase "an
Exchange established by the State" were given its plain meaning. Common sense therefore required implementing the statute as if section 1311 contained different words from the words
Congress actually enacted. But the Court was not confronting
statutory language whose meaning was relevantly indeterminate and choosing one of the plausible meanings of that language. It was confronting words that had a clear meaning and
rejecting that meaning-correctly, in my view-in order to prevent those words from defeating the purpose of the statute

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489-92.
Id. at 2492-95.
18 To be sure, there is a generic sense of "state" in which the word just means
something like "government." But that is not the normal meaning of "state,"
much less "State," in American law.
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012) (defining "State").
16
17
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overall. 2 0 In other words, the Court rejected the plain meaning
of a textual clause in favor of other, more important considerations, but when it did so it purported to be interpreting the
language rather than disregarding it.2 1
The point of the foregoing examples is not to deny the textualism gap. I agree with the conventional wisdom on which
statutory decisionmaking today is, on the whole, more governed by the wording of specific enacted clauses than constitutional decisionmaking is. But the fact that various areas of
statutory law depart from the wording of enacted clauses as
20
This understanding supports the Court's choice not to afford the Internal
Revenue Service Chevron deference in its construction of the language at issue in
King. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (refusing, on a rationale different from the
one explained here, to afford Chevron deference). Chevron deference applies when
statutory language could reasonably be given legal force in more than one way. In
King, the plain meaning of section 1311 pointed to a certain way of giving legal
force to the statute, and the overall plan of the statute pointed to another. But the
fact that the plain meaning of section 1311 and the overall plan of the statute
pointed in two different directions does not mean that there were two reasonable
interpretations of the law. Given the statute overall, giving legal force to the plain
meaning of section 1311 would have been unreasonable. Put differently, the
interpretation of the ACA proffered by the King challengers was not one reasonable interpretation out of some larger set of plausible reasonable decisions. It was
just wrong, despite the fact that it would have given the statute a meaning that
accorded with the plain meaning of section 1311's language.
One could also shed light on this point by asking about the locus of the
alleged "ambiguity" in King. What, precisely, was ambiguous? The answer cannot
be section 1311 standing alone. Standing alone, the words of section 1311 unambiguously point to the meaning for which the challengers contended. The Court's
reasoning might accordingly be taken to mean that section 1311 was ambiguous
in context-that when the ACA is considered as a whole, the meaning of section
1311 becomes less clear. But it is not correct, I suggest, to think that there was
any relevant ambiguity at the level of the statute as a whole. Considered as a
whole, the ACA clearly points to the result sought by the government.
The fact that the statute as a whole clearly requires departing from the plain
wording of section 1311 does not make that wording "ambiguous." It means that
section 1311 must be given a meaning different from the meaning it would plainly
have standing on its own. In particular, section 1311 must be read to refer to
exchanges established by the federal government as well as to exchanges established by states. To state baldly what should be obvious, language that must be
given one particular meaning is not "ambiguous," regardless of whether the one
meaning the language must be given Is its literal meaning or some other meaning.
And where there is no ambiguity-no multiplicity of reasonable ways in which
legal language could be given force-there is no role for Chevron deference.
21
As noted in the first paragraph of this Response, "textualism" names a
family of interpretive approaches rather than a single rule or set of rules. There is
of course a sense in which such a decision like King, which is based on the overall
plan or purpose of a statute, Is not less "textual" than a decision that hews closely
to particular language in the statute, because both the meaning of the particular
words and the sense of a statute overall can reasonably be described as considerations about the text. But as was also noted, see supra note 2 and accompanying
text, It is the role of close reading, or of "clause-bound" textualism, that is of
interest in the present analysis.
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much as any area of constitutional law suggests that the formal
division between statutory and constitutional cases is not
enough to explain the textualism gap.
II
THREE FACTORS

I suspect that more substantive considerations do the work
of determining when courts hew closely to enacted clauses and
when they are more willing to reason in other ways. Above, I
noted three relevant factors: the determinacy of enacted
clauses, the presence of precedent, and the potential cost of
hewing closely to the wording of enacted language. Consider
each now in a bit more depth.
(1) Indeterminacy. Serkin and Tebbe note the difference
between enacted language that articulates precise rules and
enacted language that articulates less determinate standards. 2 2 Not all texts are equally directive, and a court confronting a less-directive text is more likely to reason in ways
that go beyond the words in front of it, if only because it is
impossible to decide the case without doing so. But that difference between rule-like and standard-like texts is only the
beginning.
(2) Precedent. Another factor is the difference between legal questions with thick accumulations of case law on point
and legal questions where the case law is thinner. The first
case to construe a constitutional clause, like the first case to
construe a statutory provision, is more likely to reason closely
about the text than the hundredth case decided under the
same language, because the hundredth case has ninety-nine
precedents shaping its approach. If those precedents are sufficient to dispose of the issue, then the court is unlikely to reason closely about the underlying enacted language at all. It
doesn't need to. Indeed, it might go wrong by doing so, because
part of a court's responsibility is to decide consistently with
precedent. And even if the precedents don't fully dispose of the
issue, the question that the court must decide might be one to
which no close reading of the underlying text would speak,
either because governing doctrine had already traveled a fair
distance from enacted text, or, if the doctrine was fairly understood as working within possible meanings of enacted text,
because the question presented for decision might concern
22

Serkin & Tebbe, supra note 4, at 719.
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something that had never been adequately specified by that
text.
(3) Cost. Some cases have a great deal at stake, whether
practically or symbolically or both. Others matter less. Where
relatively little is at stake, courts are more likely to be content
to go where a text (or any other preexisting authority) points
them, regardless of whether that destination seems sensible to
them on the merits. But the more that a case matters-or
perhaps more precisely, the more that the decisionmakers
think that a particular outcome in the case would be awful 2 3
the more those decisionmakers are likely to resist authorities
that seem to direct undesirable outcomes. It is one thing to
lose a dollar because of a poorly worded clause, and it is quite
another to lose a kingdom because of one. Reasonable people
expend more effort in fighting the latter prospect than they do
in fighting the former one. So the tendency to reject a text and
the tendency to work hard to find a way to re-read that text
both increase as the perceived cost of obeying the conventional
reading of the text increases.
III
ASSESSING THE FACTORS

The literature on constitutional interpretation canonically
points to the first factor-the indeterminacy of the relevant
texts-as a reason why constitutional interpreters frequently
reason nontextually. 2 4 There is something to that observation.
I suspect, however, that the second variable-the existence of
relevant precedent-explains more of the textualism gap be23 This refinement is meant to operate along two dimensions. First, the importance of a case for these purposes is measured subjectively, from the decisionmakers' point of view, rather than objectively. What matters for predicting
whether decisionmakers will be content to follow a text meekly, even when it
seems to point in a bad direction, is the decisionmakers' sense of the stakes rather
than anything about what the stakes "really" are. See infra pp. 109-10. Second,
by saying that the willingness to depart from textual authority rises with the
decisionmakers' sense that a particular outcome would be awful, rather than just
the sense that a lot is at stake, I mean to point out that decisionmakers often
know that a legal question is important but do not have a confident sense of which
outcome would be harmful. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Parchmentand Politics: The
Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARv. L. REv. 657, 694 (2011)
(suggesting that decisionmakers are often unable to predict whether constitutional decisionmaking procedures will yield outcomes they favor or outcomes they
oppose). A decisionmaker in that situation might be delighted to have a rule to
follow mechanically, because it relieves him of the responsibility for the decision.
24
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that several constitutional
clauses cannot be given determinate legal content unless the interpreter looks
beyond the words of the clause).
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tween statutory and constitutional interpretation than the first
factor does.
Consider equal protection cases. In most cases that we say
"arise under the Equal Protection Clause," courts do not reason
about the meaning of the words "equal protection," struggle
with the indeterminacy of that phrase, and then reason
nontextually to decide which possible meaning of those words
is most appropriate. 2 5 They simply consult case law, deciding
the issues before them without ever grappling with the possible
meanings of the words "equal protection." So it is true that the
words "equal protection" do not carry a single, determinate
meaning. But the indeterminacy of the clause's meaning is not
what prompts courts to engage in the kind of nontextual reasoning in which they do in fact engage. What drives courts to
reason as they do is a thick body of case law.
One might be tempted to think that the existence of that
thick body of case law is itself a product of the indeterminacy of
the underlying text. If that were so, then the indeterminate
meaning of the words "equal protection" would still be driving
the nontextual decisionmaking we see in equal protection
cases, just at one remove. Textual indeterminacy would drive
the development of case law as a means of settling questions
that could not be resolved on the basis of the text alone, and
the fact that judges made decisions based on that case law
rather than directly on the basis of the text would then be
traceable to that text's indeterminate meaning.
Perhaps such a dynamic does account for a share of constitutional interpretation's tendency to operate less textually than
statutory interpretation. But we should not overestimate that
share. After all, broadly worded and standard-like constitutional clauses are not the only ones that become the subjects of
thickly developed case law. Consider the Eleventh Amendment. 2 6 No first-semester law student identifies the Eleventh
25 In the Supreme Court's recent landmark decision in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), the opinion of the Court used the words
"equal protection" four times: once when stating the question presented, id. at
2204, once when stating the holding of a lower court, id., once when stating the
petitioner's claim, id. at 2207, and once when stating the meaning of one of its
own precedential cases, id. at 2210. At no point did the Court engage questions
about the range of meanings that the phrase "equal protection" might bear, nor
did it at any point frame its analysis as answering questions about how to particularize the meaning of those words.
26
U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.").

1660

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:1649

Amendment as a text that speaks in broad and indeterminate
principles. It reads like the statement of a relatively specific
rule. 2 7 But that has not prevented the development of a thick
body of case law. When judges decide Eleventh Amendment
cases, they do so on the basis of that case law rather than by
reading the text closely, and their reason for doing so is not
that the text is broad and indeterminate.
What drives interpreters to develop thick case law, and to
decide cases nontextually, in contexts like Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, where the text is not especially broad? A
big part of the answer, I suspect, is about the third factor I
identified above: the perceived cost of hewing closely to the text.
For many constitutional interpreters, state sovereign immunity
and the related issues of federalism are enormously important.
These interpreters are strongly committed to the idea that the
constitutional system requires a certain set of answers to the
relevant questions. The text of the Eleventh Amendment, on its
face, would not vindicate the answers to which these interpreters are sincerely and powerfully committed. And their commitment is strong enough to prompt them to depart from the
enacted language, even though the language is specific rather
than general. 28
I suspect that this third reason for nontextual decisionmaking-the stakes of a case, and the unacceptably high cost
of the result that simple forms of textualism would direct-has
been underappreciated in the recent literature on legal interpretation. Indeed, I suspect that this third factor is sometimes
the most powerful force in prompting nontextual decisionmaking. And it operates in statutory cases as well as constitutional
ones.
Consider King v. Buwvell again. Each of the first two factors discussed above would seem to make King a case in which
courts would hew closely to the language of the clause at issue.
First, the relevant wording-"an Exchange established by the
State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and Afforda27
See generally John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading
of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1665-67 (2004) (characterizing the Eleventh Amendment as "precise"). To be sure, one can argue about
whether a text is specific or general. But if the wording of the Eleventh Amendment is nonspecific, then so is most if not all of the wording of the U.S. Code, and
that would mean that we could not point to the generality of the Constitution's
wording as a factor that distinguished statutory from constitutional
interpretation.
28
That is exactly what Manning cogently argues ought not to happen. Id. at
1665. And yet it does.
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ble Care Act"-did not force judges to reason nontextually by
virtue of being broad or general. The clause states a rule, not a
standard, and the rule is stated with a fair degree of specificity.
Second, the issue was a matter of first impression. No prior
Supreme Court decisions had construed the meaning of the
language at issue. So the Court's choice to depart from the
plain meaning of section 1311 in favor of considerations of
statutory purpose and common sense was not driven by either
of the first two factors. It was driven instead, I think, by the
third factor: the enormous cost of taking the plain meaning of
section 1311 as authoritative. Giving the words "established
by the State" their ordinary meaning would have made hash of
a major statute and wrecked a gargantuan government program. That consideration was strong enough to overcome
whatever tendency the first two factors might have had to foster
a ruling based on the plain meaning of the words "established
by the State." 2 9
Something similar is true with respect to affirmative action
under Title VII, or at least with respect to the initial cases
departing from statutory language in that domain. The reason
why courts permit affirmative action in workplaces covered by
Title VII is not that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 contains broad or
open-ended language on the point. The wording of section
2000e-2 would pretty clearly prohibit employers from practicing affirmative action if it were given its plain meaning. And
courts have not pretended that the language itself is indeterminate. They have simply overcome the language, ruling that
29
It is worth noting that in the particular case of King, the enormous potential consequences of the case were the motivation for the plaintiffs' making the
close-reading argument in the first place, as well as the major reason for refusing
to accept that argument. The case in King arose as a deliberate attempt to wreck
the ACA; the architects of the challenge scoured the statute's language for weaknesses that could be used to bring down the system, and they found 26 U.S.C.
§ 36B(b)-(c). Absent the motivation to destroy the ACA, it is likely that nobody
would have given the language "an Exchange established by the State" its plain
meaning simply because nobody would have thought about it. As a matter of the
common sense of the regulatory plan, 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)-(c) was obviously supposed to apply to exchanges established by the federal government as well as
those established by states, and everyone would have operated the statutory
scheme that way without a second thought if nobody had gone looking for
problems. But once the linguistic glitch was spotted and made salient, a court
would need to overcome the plain meaning of the language in order to deny the
plaintiffs' claim. In a case with less at stake, the Supreme Court might well have
gone along with the challenge, saying something like, "Look, we know that reading
'State' to mean 'State' might make a mess of how Congress intended its system to
work, but hey, this is what they legislated, and it's not our job to clean up after
them." But that argument goes down easier when the mess is small. See discussion of Lamie v. United States Trustee infra p. 116.
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affirmative action is sometimes permissible even though the
words of section 2000e-2 do not seem to permit it.30 Today, of
course, the reason why courts permit affirmative action despite
the wording of section 2000e-2 is that case law directs them to.
But when the first cases establishing this line of precedent
were decided, it mattered that the permissibility vel non of affirmative action was highly important, both as a practical matter and as a symbolic one. The Supreme Court that decided
United Steelworkers v. Weber3 1 in 1979 was not going to let
affirmative action in the workplace disappear just because the
language of section 2000e-2, read strictly, would prohibit itnot as long as the Court could say, and, I am confident, believe,
that the overall purpose of Title VII was consistent with some
affirmative action, whether or not affirmative action was consistent with the letter of the statute. 3 2
Now consider the constitutional domain. As noted earlier,
most cases here are decided by reference to judicial precedent,
not by reference to enacted constitutional text. Many bodies of
constitutional doctrine are, at least officially, engaged in giving
meaning to textual standards that are too indeterminate to
dispose of particular cases, such that courts must engage in
nontextual reasoning in order to apply the text at all. Think of
free speech cases, or takings cases, or cases about cruel and
unusual punishments. But as also noted earlier, constitutional decisionmaking frequently proceeds under precedent
even when the associated text is specific, and in some contexts
the doctrines developed to "apply" those texts cannot reasonably be described as particularizing those texts further. Instead,
the doctrines direct decisionmaking that competent speakers
of English who did not know the stakes of the cases would
30 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding a private affirmative action plan aimed at addressing the past practices that had
blocked African Americans from holding certain positions).
31

Id.

32 The resemblance between Weber and King is obvious, with the distinction
that in King the Court labored to declare the statutory language "ambiguous,"
rather than forthrightly acknowledging its choice to do something at variance with
the wording of an enacted clause. That difference Is likely the product of a
changed legal culture. In 2015, judges were much less willing than they were in
1979 to admit, and perhaps even to recognize, that they are doing something
other than abiding by an available meaning of particular enacted language. The
desire to maintain the pretense that one is not subordinating a statute's wording

to other considerations is what drives the Court in King to its nonstandard deployment of the word "ambiguous." In current practice, perhaps a clause is "ambiguous" if either (a) its language admits of two different meanings, or (b) the one
meaning of which its language admits is so unfortunate that courts will refuse to
give that meaning legal force. (Call this the ambiguity of ambiguity).
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simply never imagine could be plausible interpretations of the
constitutional language. Above, I gave the example of Eleventh
Amendment doctrine. Other examples include cases applying
the First Amendment against the federal executive branch3 3
and cases reading the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limit
on Congress's delegated powers rather than an instruction applicable in cases where Congress has no delegated power to act
upon. 3 4 In these cases, the courts are not choosing among
possible plain meanings of the relevant words in constitutional
clauses. The First Amendment says that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." 3 5 There is no
theory of plain meaning on which "Congress" might mean "The
President." None, anyway, that preserves what a theory of
plain meaning is supposed to deliver, because a theory on
which "Congress" might mean "The President" is a theory on
which language could mean a lot of surprising things, and that
is exactly what plain-meaning jurisprudence is supposed to
prevent.
So the reason why courts do not hew closely to the wording
of enacted texts in these contexts is not that the textual language is imprecise. It is that following the specifications of the
language would yield unacceptable results in fields of law too
important to be sacrificed to the abstract idea that plain language ought to govern. Courts are unwilling, and properly so,
to permit Presidents to censor speech, because doing so would
betray a deeply held American value and probably enable the
President to become a dangerously threatening figure. Current
doctrine reads the Tenth Amendment as affirmatively pushing
back against the enumerated powers of Congress on the theory
that the essence of American federalism requires such a doctrine, whether the wording of the Constitution captures it or
not. In short, mainstream interpretive practice is for courts to
depart from enacted language when they really need to-that
is, when they see a lot to lose from a mechanical application of
the idea that enacted language, read plainly, states the law.
33

See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (applying the

First Amendment against the federal executive despite its being addressed to
"Congress").
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See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) ("[U]nder the

Commerce Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the First

Amendment. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but
this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itselfl.]"). For

further development of this point about the Tenth Amendment, see Richard
Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 629-30 (2014).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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A caveat is here in order. The point is not that the areas of
law-be they constitutional or statutory-in which courts set
aside the plain meaning of enacted texts have systematically
higher stakes than those in which courts stay within the limits
of enacted phrases. Much of the time, enacted language successfully describes what a court should do in order to prevent
things from going badly wrong. As a result, courts (and other
officials) can usually keep the government operating smoothly
without departing from the directions given in relevant statutes
and constitutional clauses. It is not necessary to depart from
plain meanings in order to authorize the federal government to
maintain the armed forces,3 6 or to prohibit states from holding
whites-only elections, 3 7 or to prevent Congress from declaring
its members officeholders for life.3 8 The situation where courts
must set plain meanings aside in order to prevent seriously
adverse consequences arises only when something has gone
wrong, either because the text was badly written or because
something important-maybe a material circumstance, maybe
the prevailing set of normative values-has changed since the
text was written.
So with respect to each kind of enacted text, two questions
arise. First, how often does something go wrong in one of these
ways? Second, when something does go wrong in one of these
ways, what are the costs of hewing closely to enacted language?
One of the reasons why constitutional law lends itself to
"less textual" decisionmaking than statutory law, I suspect, is
that a larger proportion of the cases falling within the constitutional domain have high stakes, whether practically or symbolically. So even if the Constitution and the U.S. Code were
drafted with equal degrees of skill and equal degrees of specificity, and even if both texts were revised to keep up with a changing world at the same rate (which of course they are not),
constitutional litigation would probably involve a higher percentage of cases in which courts would be put to the choice
between abiding by the words of enacted clauses and sanctioning terrible results. Assuming that judges are no less inclined
to avoid terrible results in constitutional litigation than in other
kinds of litigation, we should expect judges to depart from enacted language more often in the constitutional context.
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See U.S. CoNSr. art. I,
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In suggesting that constitutional law involves a higher proportion of high-stakes cases than statutory law does, I am not
claiming that constitutional law is more important overall than
statutory law, nor that in each year the number of high-stakes
constitutional cases exceeds the number of high-stakes statutory cases, nor that the most important cases are always constitutional. I am not claiming that all constitutional cases are
high-stakes cases, nor even that most of them are. It is obviously true that modem America is pervasively structured by
statutory law, and a reasonable case could be made for the
proposition that the U.S. Code today is, as a practical matter,
more important, both in the functioning of American government and in the lives of individual Americans, than the Constitution is.39
But the U.S. Code, being orders of magnitude more extensive and prolix than the Constitution, also gives rise to a great
many low-stakes cases. A "low-stakes case," in the sense in
which I intend the term, is one in which the decisionmakers do
not feel deeply invested in the outcome, except in the general
sense in which they always think it important to get decisions
right. To be sure, many of the cases I am calling "low-stakes"
are important to someone. The parties to particular cases often
have a great deal at stake, even if nothing about the case is
unusually salient from the perspective of the decisionmaker.
To criminal defendant Smith facing the possibility of prison,
United States v. Smith is a high-stakes case, and it is a highstakes case regardless of whether it turns legally on a statutory
question (like the meaning of an element in a federal criminal
law) or a constitutional one (like whether evidence was gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment). But most judges
regard criminal prosecutions as routine, meaning not that they
see the cases as unimportant, but that their importance is of
an ordinary sort within the judges' professional lives. Similarly, statutory cases in civil litigation might decide matters of
considerable personal and economic importance to a great
many people without being especially salient to the judiciary.
Consider Lamie v. United States Dtustee,40 which Serkin and
39

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE

NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 27 (2010).

My only hesitation in agreeing to that

proposition outright is that I find it hard to think about either regime in hermetic
isolation from the other. But that means only that the idea that statutory law is
more important should not be taken too woodenly, not that it lacks an important
message about how modem American government really works.
40

540 U.S. 526 (2004).
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Tebbe discuss as an example of statutory textualism. 4 1 It
seems plausible that a ruling about the availability of attorneys' fees in bankruptcy cases would have important effects on
many people, including those who practice bankruptcy law as
well as those who are bankrupt or who are the creditors of
bankrupt estates. Congress bothered to pass the relevant statute, after all. But from the perspective of a federal court, the
question in Lamie might just be one of many going to the intricate and opaque mass of regulation that the law provides for a
complex society. Before the briefs in Lamie landed on their
desks, Article III judges might have had no view on the issue at
all, and they might not worry much about the issue once the
decision is handed down. The decisions I am calling "highstakes," in contrast, are the ones whose outcomes are particularly salient to the judges, either because of their expected
consequences or their symbolic value or both.
So maybe the textualism gap between constitutional and
statutory interpretation is mostly explained by two facts. First,
statutory litigation presents more matters of first impression
than constitutional litigation does. After all, the U.S. Code is a
great deal more extensive than the U.S. Constitution. It contains orders of magnitude more clauses to be litigated, and new
ones are produced at a much faster rate than new constitutional clauses are. Given this difference in the number of topics that are litigated, judicial precedent-the chief displacer of
enacted textual authority-does its displacing work less frequently in statutory cases than in constitutional ones. Second,
constitutional litigation might be more likely than statutory
litigation to put judges to the choice between nontextual decisionmaking and unacceptable results. Not because the Constitution is especially poorly drafted, and not because bad
decisionmaking in statutory-cases is a low-cost affair from society's point of view, but because most. of the statutory issues
that courts confront as matters of first impression are not issues in which the judges are deeply invested on the merits.
CONCLUSION

Serkin and Tebbe's titular question is whether the Constitution is special. With specific reference to the textualism gap,
I think the answer is partly no and partly yes. By proposing
that departures from the wording of enacted clauses are driven
by the same factors in the statutory and constitutional con41
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texts, I am pushing back against the claim that prevailing prac
tice treats constitutional text differently Just because it is the
text of the Constitution. More particularly, I do not think that
the largest cause of the textualism gap-the relatively larger
share of precedential decisionmaking in constitutional law
reflects a way in which the Constitution is "special," at least not
in the sense that interests Serkin and Tebbe. It reflects, as
noted above, the fact that the Constitution is much shorter
than the U.S. Code, or more precisely the fact that there are far
fewer substantive issues that get litigated under the Constitu
tion, which means that a larger share of all constitutional liti
gation arises in areas with prior case law.
But the tendency of constitutional law to present a higher
share of cases where judges feel there is something important
to lose does reflect a way in which the Constitution is special.
It does so for a reason that I have the space here to gesture at
but not to argue for at length. In brief: constitutional law does
not skew toward highly salient cases because the text of the
Constitution happens, by design or accident or both, to ad
dress the most salient issues in American law. It skews toward
highly salient cases because American lawyers find ways, con
sciously and unconsciously, to make the issues that are most
salient to them into constitutional issues. The Constitution
always embodies the deepest values and highest aspirations of
the American people-not because the words of the document
name a set of values and aspirations that were most salient to
the document's authors and which have remained constant
over time, but because constitutional interpretation is a prac
tice in which Americans invest the document, in its particular
phrases and in general, with meanings that are relevant to
their own values and aspirations.42 That is special. As long
as American constitutional practice exhibits that dynamic,
constitutional cases will contain a relatively high share of the
cases where judges see the most to lose from bad decisionsand the most to be gained from avoiding too mechanical a
reliance on the language of enacted text.

42

See irifra Richard Primus, The Constitutional Constant.

